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1. INTRODUCTION I 
This chapter provides a very brief summary of the central features of American criminal I 
law. Section II describes its source and current form, which is almost exclusively statutory, 
embodied in the criminal codes of each of the fifty American states and (to a lesser extent) 
the federal criminal code. Section III sketches the typical process by which a case moves 
through an American criminal justice system, from the report of a crime through trial 
1and appellate review. Section IV summarizes the most basic objective and culpability re­ I 
quirements necessary to establish liability for an offense and the doctrines that sometimes j 
impute those elements when they do not in fact exist. Section V describes the general de­ ,j 
Ifenses that may bar liability, even if the offense elements are satisfied or imputed. Finally, '1 
section VI describes the general organization of a typical American criminal code's defi­ l 
\ 
nition of offenses and gives highlights concerning a few of the most common offenses. 
II. THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 
A. Source and Form 
In the eighteenth century, English criminal law was generally uncodified. This "common 
law" was developed by-and embodied in-judicial opinions. The American colonies ad­
opted the common law of England as it existed at the time of American independence. 
The period's most popular treatise, William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, became a highly influential work in America not because of anything particu­
larly distinguished about the four volumes, but simply because its popularity coincided 
with American independence. Volume 4 provided a useful summary of the then-existing 
body of common-law criminal jurisprudence.! American courts then took on the role of 
further refining and developing the law, thereby creating differences with English law. 
Today's courts generally no longer have the role of refining and developing the criminal 
law; that function has been taken over by legislatures. Nearly every state has a criminal 
code as its primary source of criminal law. Courts interpret the code but generally have no 
authority to create new crimes or change the definition of existing crimes. The reasons for 
the shift from common-law, judicially defined offenses to criminal codes are found chiefly 
in the rationales offered in support of what is called the legality principle, discussed in sec­
tion n.B in this chapter. 
1. Modern Criminal Code Reform 
Although there were some heroic efforts, little criminal code reform occurred in the 
United States before the 1960s. Most early codes were less a code and more a collection of 
ad hoc statutory enactments, each triggered by a crime or a crime problem that gained 
significant public interest for a time. The major contribution of early codifiers frequently 
was to put the offenses in alphabetical order. The greatest catalyst of modern American 
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criminal law codification was the Model Penal Code, which was promulgated by the 
American Law Institute (ALI) in 1962. Since its introduction, the Model Penal Code has 
served as the basis for wholesale replacement of existing criminal codes in almost three­
quarters of the states. Some states adopted the Code with only minor revisions, while 
others-especially those that adopted it early-borrowed the Model Penal Code's style 
and form but only some of its content in the course of reworking their existing doctrine. 
2. The Model Penal Code 
The American Law Institute, which drafted the Model Code, is a nongovernmental, 
broad-based, and highly regarded group of lawyers, judges, professors, and others that 
undertakes research and drafting projects designed to bring rationality and enlighten­
ment to American law. The Institute's Restatements of the Law have been influential in 
bringing clarity and uniformity to many fields, such as tort law and contract law. Al­
though a criminal law project was undertaken by the Institute in 1953, it was concluded 
that the criminal law of the various states had become too disparate to permit a "restate­
ment," and, in any case the existing law was too unsound and ill considered to merit re­
stating. What was needed instead was a model criminal code. After nine years of work 
and a series of Tentative Drafts, the Institute approved an Official Draft in 1962. Later, the 
original commentary contained in the various Tentative Drafts was consolidated, revised, 
and finally in 1985 published along with the 1962 text as a six-volume set.2 
3. Continuing Reform Efforts 
About one-quarter of the states have not yet adopted a modern criminal code. The federal 
system is the most unfortunate example of frustrated reform. Congress has been engaged 
in an effort to reform the federal criminal code since 1966. At one point a modern code bill 
passed in the Senate but did not pass in the House. Criminal code reform is always difficult 
because it touches highly political issues, but the lack of a modern federal criminal code is 
a matter of some embarrassment in a country whose states lead the world in enlightened 
criminal law codification. The present federal criminal code is not significantly different in 
form from the alphabetical listing of offenses that was typical of the original American 
codes in the 1800s. Fortunately, the u.S. Constitution vests the criminal law power in the 
states, not in the federal government, which has jurisdiction over only uniquely federal 
offenses. 
4. Central Features ofModern American Codes 
Modern American codes stand apart from many other modern codes because they are 
designed to include a comprehensive and self-contained statement of all the rules re­
quired to adjudicate all criminal cases. They try not to depend on other sources of law, 
academic or judicial. Modern codes have a general part containing general provisions that 
apply to the specific offenses defined in the code's special part. General provisions include 
such things as general rules for the definition and interpretation of offenses; a collection 
of definitions for commonly used terms; general liability doctrines concerning omission lia­
bility, complicity, and voluntary intoxication; and general defenses, such as self-defense, in­
sanity, and time limitations. In the special part of a code, ofienses are defined and organized 
as conceptually related groups and are formulated and consolidated to minimize overlaps 
among offenses and gaps between them. A significant practical effect of reform is that 
code sections can no longer be read in isolation. To fully understand each offense defini­
tion in the special part, several provisions in the general part must be consulted. 
B. The Legality Principle 
In its original Latin dress the legality principle was expressed as nullum crimen sine lege, 
nulla poena sine lege, meaning roughly, "no crime without law, nor punishment without 
law." In its modern form it means that criminal liability and punishment can be based 
only on a prior legislative enactl!1ent of liability rules expressed with adequate precision 
and clarity. The principle is not itself a legal rule, but rather a legal concept embodied in a 
series oflegal rules and doctrines. 
1. Legality Doctrines 
Two of the doctrines that make up the legality principle include the rules in modern 
American criminal codes that abolish common-law crimes and prohibit the judicial cre­
ation ofoffenses. In contrast, in 1962 the English House of Lords approved prosecution of 
a common-law offense of "conspiracy to corrupt public morals."3 American jurisdictions 
typically would bar prosecution for such an uncodified offense because it is undefined by 
statute. In addition, the legality principle is embodied in the constitutional prohibition of 
vague statutes, the rule requiring strict construction of penal statutes, and the constitu­
tional prohibition of application of ex post facto laws. 
The vagueness prohibition, rooted in the Constitution's Due Process Clause, requires that a 
criminal statute give "sufficient warning that men may conform their conduct so as to avoid 
that which is forbidden."4 A statute is not unconstitutionally vague, however, merely because 
one ofits elements calls for a matter of judgment. Rather, an offense provision is vague ifit does 
not adequately define the prohibited conduct. If an offense definition defines the prohibited 
conduct with some specificity but is subject to two or more interpretations, then it is termed 
ambiguous, which is not necessarily unconstitutional. When faced with an ambigUity, the law 
traditionally applies a special rule for interpreting criminal statutes. The rule of strict con­
struction, as it is called, directs that an ambiguity in a penal statute be resolved against the 
state and in favor of the defendant. 5 For this reason, it is also called the rule oflenity. 
One final legality doctrine is the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.6 
This has been interpreted to invalidate "[e]very law that makes an action done before the 
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such ac­
tion. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 
Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law 
annexed to the crime, when committed."7 
2. Legality Principle Rationales 
The American devotion to the legality principle arises from rationales unrelated to, and 
often in conflict with, blameworthiness. Although not all the rationales may be applicable 
in all situations, the rationales most commonly offered in support of the legality principle 
include the following. 
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i. Procedural Fairness 
Fairness requires that a person have at least an opportunity to find out what the criminal 
law commands. Actual notice is not required for liability; it is enough that the prohibition 
has been lawfully enacted. Similarly, a defendant's actual knowledge that the conduct is 
prohibited and punished does not vitiate a legality-based defense. The concern of the le­
gality principle is procedural fairness, not blamelessness. 
ii. Criminalization as a Legislative Function 
In a democracy the legislature-the most representative branch of government-is gener­
ally thought to be the proper body to exercise the criminalization decision. This rationale 
directly supports the prohibition of judicial creation of offenses and the abolition of judi­
cially created offenses. It also has application in less obvious ways to support the invalida­
tion of vague statutes and the disapproval of ambiguous statutes. Courts applying such 
statutes provide the specificity the legislature has not-a de facto delegation of criminal­
ization authority to the courts. 
iii. Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication 
The rationales noted so far-procedural fairness and reserving the criminalization func­
tion to the legislature-concern the rule-articulation function of the criminal law, under­
stood as its obligation to communicate the governing rules to all members of society. The 
rationales reflect the American preference for how that rule-articulation function ought 
to be performed: the legislature should set the rules, and the formulations should be cal­
culated to give adequate notice to deter effectively and properly and to condemn a viola­
tion fairly. But the criminal law also serves an adjudication function, with which several 
rationales in support of the legality principle are associated. 
iv. Inconsistency and Abuse of Discretion 
Consistency in the treatment of similar cases is possible only with a sufficiently clear and 
precise definition of an offense, one that does not call for discretionary judgments. With 
individual discretion inevitably comes disparity based on the inherent differences among 
decision makers. Also, the exercise of discretion can allow the operation of malevolent 
influences, such as racism, sexism, and the like. An unclear prohibition, therefore, can 
create a potential for abuse of discretion by police officers, prosecutors, and others with 
decision-making authority. In Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, for example, police of­
ficers arrested "mixed" couples (of blacks and whites), charging them with a variety of 
vague offenses such as "vagrancy," "loitering," and"disorderly loitering on street." The 
Supreme Court reversed the convictions finding that the vagueness of the statutes encour­
aged arbitrary convictions, as well as arbitrary arrests.s 
III. 	 A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 
The authority to define and punish crimes is vested primarily in the states, not in the federal 
government (except for offenses relating to a special federal interest). Thus there are fifty­
two American criminal justice systems (including the federal and District of Columbia 
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systems), and each is different from the others in some way. Below is a brief description of 
a procedural process that is typical in most American criminal justice systems. 
A. Investigation and Accusation 
1. Report and Investigation 
The criminal justice process usually begins with a report of a crime by a citizen or a police 
officer. Typically an investigation follows to determine whether a crime has in fact been 
committed and, if so, by whom. Once a suspect has been identified, the investigation may 
continue in order to collect evidence for use in prosecution. 
2. Arrest and Booking 
When a police officer believes that there exists "probable cause" to think that a crime was 
committed and that a particular suspect committed it, the officer may arrest that suspect. 
Sometimes the evidence is presented to a magistrate beforehand and a judicial warrant to 
arrest is obtained, but most arrests are made without a warrant. An arrest is essentially a 
taking of physical control over the person and usually includes a search of the person for 
weapons, contraband, and evidence relating to the crime. The arrestee is then taken to the 
police station, where he or she is "booked." This procedure consists of entering the ar­
restee's name, the time, and the offense charged in a police log. The arrestee is photo­
graphed and fingerprinted, informed of the charge, and allowed to make a telephone call. 
Those charged with minor offenses are allowed to post cash security as "station-house 
bail," which allows them to leave the police station with a promise to appear before a mag­
istrate at a specified date. Persons who are arrested for more serious offenses or who are 
unable to post station-house bail are sent to a "lockup" after another more careful search, 
including an inventory of their personal possessions. 
3. Precharge Screening 
The first of many reviews of the charging decision is frequently made at this point. A higher­
ranking police officer may reduce or drop the charges for which a suspect was booked. This 
may occur either because the evidence is insufficient to proceed or because an informal 
disposition-perhaps including a lecture and warning-is more appropriate. Ten to 20 percent 
of all cases are dropped from the system at this point. A member of the prosecutor's office also 
may screen the cases during this stage, although this frequently occurs only in felony cases. 
4. Filing Complaint 
If it is determined that the prosecution will proceed, formal charges are filed with the 
court via a "complaint." This document briefly describes the facts of the case and is sworn 
to by the complainant, likely to be either the victim or the investigating officer. The affiant 
(or person giving the affidavit) can swear only to the facts known to him or her, of course, 
so a complaint by the investigating officer is likely to contain only claims about what the 
officer believes or what others reported. A magistrate will review the complaint ex parte 
(without the presence or participation of the parties) to determine whether probable cause 
exists to believe that the "defendant," as he or she is now called, committed the offense 
charged. If the magistrate is not satisfied that there is probable cause, he or she will dismiss 
the complaint, but without prejudice-that is, the prosecutor may amend and refile the 
complaint in the future. Where an arrest warrant was previously obtained on the basis of 
a complaint, this step will, of course, already be complete; the defendant will be taken di­
rectly from booking to the initial appearance. 
5. Initial Appearance 
Soon after a person is arrested and booked, unless released on station-house bail, he or she 
is brought before a magistrate. The magistrate confirms that the arrestee is the person 
named in the complaint and informs the arrestee of his or her constitutional rights, in­
cluding the right to remain silent, the right to have counsel, and the right to have counsel 
appointed ifhe or she cannot afford one. Frequently, counsel is appointed at this stage. 
6. Bail 
The magistrate at the initial appearance also reviews any bail conditions previously set at the 
station house and sets bail for those arrestees who did not previously have it set. High bail 
amounts typically require the services of a professional bondsman to ensure the defendant's 
appearance, to whom the defendant must pay a nonrefundable or only partially refundable 
fee. Increasingly, defendants have been allowed to pay, in cash, an amount equal to 10 per­
cent of the total bail amount, which is then refundable if the defendant appears as directed. 
B. Pretrial 
l. Preliminary Hearing 
For felony cases, another judicial screening decision is made within a week or two of the 
initial appearance. Unlike the ex parte review at the complaint stage, this screening involves 
an adversarial process where the prosecution presents witnesses and the defendant, now 
represented by counsel, may cross-examine. The defendant may present his or her own evi­
dence but in practice rarely does so, preferring instead to learn as much as possible about 
the prosecution's case without divulging his or her own defense. The magistrate may dis­
miss the charges or may allow only a lesser charge than that alleged in the complaint. 
2. Grand Jury Indictment and ProsecutorialInformation 
Another screening stage for felonies is grand jury review to determine whether an indict­
ment should be returned against a defendant. The federal system and about half the states 
give felony defendants a right to grand jury review. A grand jury is made up of citizens 
who are called to meet regularly to review cases during a set term of perhaps several 
months. The traditional size is twenty-three people, of whom a majority of twelve must 
agree in order to indict a defendant. This majority corresponds to the standard size of a 
trial jury. The grand jury review procedure is significantly different from trial and from 
the preliminary hearing; it is in fact more akin to a magistrate's review of a complaint. 
Only the prosecution presents witnesses; the hearing is held in secret; and the defendant 
has no right to be present. 
3. Arraignment 
If the defendant is indicted by the grand jury, the indictment substitutes for the complaint 
as the formal charging document. The defendant is arraigned in the general trial court on 
r 
! 
this document and is asked to plead guilty, not guilty, or, where permitted, nolo conten­
dere. A date is then set to hear pretrial and trial matters. 
4. Plea Bargaining 
From the point of filing the complaint, and sometimes before, until trial, the defense 
counsel and prosecutor may engage in plea negotiations. This may involve either an agree­
ment to dismiss some charges if the defendant will plead guilty to others or, in some ju­
risdictions, a promise of a lenient sentence or a recommendation for one in exchange for 
a plea of guilty. Challenges to the institution of the prosecution (such as challenging the 
makeup of the grand jury) or the sufficiency of the charging instrument, as well as re­
quests for discovery and motions to suppress evidence, typically are made before trial. 
These motions may produce a dismissal for a defendant without the need for a plea 
bargain. 
C. Trial and Post-Trial 
1. The Trial 
After a defendant has been arrested and charged with a crime, if there has not been a dis­
missal (on a pretrial motion) and the defendant has not entered a guilty plea, the case goes 
to trial. Several features distinguish the American criminal system from the civil system. 
These include (1) the presumption of a defendant's innocence, (2) the requirement ofproof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) the right of the defendant not to take the stand, (4) the ex­
clusion of evidence obtained by the state in an illegal manner, and (5) the more frequent 
use of incriminating statements of defendants as evidence. 
An American trial uses an adversarial process. The defendant is represented by an ad­
vocate representing his or her position, while the state's prosecutors represent the state's 
interest in punishing offenders. The sides argue in front of an impartial decision maker. In 
all fifty-two jurisdictions the defendant has a right to a jury trial for all felony offenses and 
for misdemeanors punishable by more than six months' imprisonment. Most states also 
provide a jury trial for lesser misdemeanors as well. The right to a jury trial can be waived 
in favor of a bench trial. 
2. Sentencing 
If a defendant is convicted at trial or pleads guilty before a trial takes place, the court will 
set a date for a sentencing hearing at which both sides will present evidence relating to the 
appropriate sentence. While a few jurisdictions allow for sentencing by a jury in non­
capital cases, most assign the sentence determination to the court. Typically, three differ­
ent types of sanctions can be used: financial sanctions (e.g., fines, restitution orders); 
some form of release into the community (e.g., probation, unsupervised release, house 
arrest, drug rehabilitation); and incarceration in a jail (for lesser sentences) or a prison 
(for longer sentences). The most severe form of punishment is the death penalty, the 
availability of which is determined by each individual state. The legislature typically 
sets the maximum penalty available for an offense. It sometimes also narrows the sen­
tencing options for an offense by excluding community release or by setting a manda­
tory minimum term of imprisonment. Increasingly, court sentencing decisions are re­
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stricted by guidelines that suggest a guideline sentence for offenders of a particular sort 
committing offenses of a particular sort. Some guideline systems are more binding than 
others. 
3. Appeal 
A defendant generally has a right to appeal a conviction to the next higher court in the 
particular system's judicial hierarchy. For misdemeanors tried in a magistrate court, this 
may mean a new trial in the general trial court. The right to appeal is not necessarily lim­
ited to those convicted at trial, however; a defendant who pleads guilty but who receives a 
more severe sentence than he or she expected, for example, may be able to appeal, chal­
lenging his or her plea. Appellate review of the appropriateness of the sentence is generally 
not permitted, although review of a deviation from sentencing guidelines may be. The 
most common objections on appeal concern admission of evidence claimed to be improp­
erly obtained (generally the most successful claim), insufficient evidence to support the 
conviction, incompetent counsel, improper identification procedures, and improper ad­
mission of a defendant's confession or incriminating statements. 
4. Postconviction Remedies 
After exhausting possibilities for appellate review, a convict who has not gained release 
may seek relief through postconviction remedies, sometimes called collateral attacks on 
conviction. Sometimes this is done through the writ of habeas corpus, but it is commonly 
governed by a more modern statutory procedure. After exhausting postconviction reme­
dies in state court, state prisoners who have a constitutional claim may present the same 
claim for review by the federal courts under federal postconviction remedy procedures. In 
both state and federal systems the process of appellate review of a denial of a postconvic­
tion petition follows the same appellate course that the direct appeal did. 
IV. LIABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
Offense definitions are typically made up of three kinds of objective elements-conduct, 
circumstance, and result elements-each accompanied by a corresponding culpability 
requirement of purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. Some doctrines will al­
Iowa defendant to be treated as ifhe or she satisfies a required element that is not in fact 
present, if the defendant does satisfy the requirements of a doctrine of imputation. For 
example, a defendant may be liable for an offense that requires conduct that the defendant 
did not commit if the conduct, performed by another person, is imputed to the defendant 
by the complicity doctrine. Finally, a defendant who is apprehended or stops before com­
pleting an offense may be held liable for an inchoate offense on the basis of his or her in­
tention to commit or encourage conduct toward the commission. 
A. Objective Offense Requirements 
Offense definitions consist of two kinds of elements: objective elements (conduct, circum­
stance, or result elements) and culpability elements (typically purpose, knowledge, reckless­
ness, or negligence). Each objective offense element has a corresponding culpability element, 
and the culpability level may be different with respect to different objective elements of the 
same offense. 
1. Conduct, Circumstance, and Result Elements 
The Model Penal Code's drafters constructed a useful system for the precise definition of 
offenses. Section 1.13(9), defining "elements of an offense," distinguishes between (i) con­
duct, (ii) attendant circumstances, and (iii) a result of conduct. These are the objective 
building blocks for offense definitions. Each offense definition typically has at least one 
conduct element, which satisfies the act requirement inherent in all criminal offenses. 
Most offense definitions include one or more circumstance elements as well, defining the 
precise nature of the prohibited conduct (e.g., having intercourse with a person under 
fourteen years old) or the characteristic of a prohibited result (e.g., causing the death of 
another human being). A minority ofoffenses contain a result element. Homicide offenses, 
personal injury offenses, and property destruction offenses are examples of this minority 
of offenses; they require a resulting physical harm in order to sustain a conviction for the 
offense. Other offenses, such as endangerment, indecent exposure, and falsification, may 
require the person to cause a risk ofharm or to cause an intangible harm, such as alarm or 
a false impression.9 
2. Causation Requirement 
Whenever an offense definition includes a result element (e.g., homicide requires a death), 
a causation requirement also is implied. 1hat is, it must be shown that the person's con­
duct caused the prohibited result. This required relation between the defendant's conduct 
and the result derives from American notions of causal accountability. The rules of the 
causation doctrine are the means by which the law attempts to define the conditions un­
der which such causal accountability exists. 
i. Requirements of Causation 
Establishing a causal connection between a defendant's conduct and a result typically has 
two independent requirements. First, the conduct must be a "but-for" cause of the result. 
That is, in the language of Model Penal Code section 2.03(1)(a), the conduct must be "an 
antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred." This is some­
times called the factual cause requirement. Second, the strength and nature of the causal 
connection between the conduct and the result must be sufficient. Legal cause, or proxi­
mate cause, as this is sometimes called, requires that the resulting harm be "not too re­
mote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on 
the gravity of his offense." 1his language, from Model Penal Code sections 2.03(2)(b) and 
(3)(b), is sometimes supplemented by an additional requirement that the resulting harm 
"not be too ... dependent on another's volitional act."l0 
ii. Factual Cause 
Conduct is a factual (but-for) cause ofa result if the result would not have occurred but for 
the conduct. In other words, the conduct is a factual cause if it was necessary for the result 
to occur. The factual cause inquiry is essentially a scientific and hypothetical one. It asks 
what the world would have been like had the defendant not performed his or her conduct. 
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Specifically, would the result still have occurred when it did? If the answer is no, then the 
defendant's conduct was necessary for, and thus was a but-for cause of, the result. 
iii. Proximate (Legal) Cause 
In contrast to the scientific inquiry of the factual cause requirement, the proximate (legal) 
cause requirement presents essentially a normative inquiry. Deciding whether a result is 
"too remote or accidental in its occurrence" or "too dependent on another's volitional act" 
obviously calls for an exercise of intuitive judgment. The inquiry cannot be resolved by 
examining the facts more closely or having scientific experts analyze the situation. Ulti­
mately, the decision maker must determine how much remoteness is "too remote" or how 
much dependence on another's volitional act is "too dependent" for the result to have a 
just bearing on the defendant's liability. Typically the foreseeability of the result following 
from the defendant's conduct is a highly influential factor in a determination ofproximate 
cause. 
B. Offense Culpability Requirements 
Modern American codes typically follow Model Penal Code section 2,02(1) in providing 
that "a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, 
or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the of­
fense," This provision reflects the criminal law's commitment to requiring not only a 
breach of society's objective rules ofconduct but also a defendant's culpability with regard 
to the conditions that make the conduct a breach. A defendant's conduct may be harmful; 
the victim may have a claim in tort; and fairness and utility both may suggest that the 
defendant rather than the victim should bear the loss for the injury, But without culpabil­
ity in the defendant, causing the injury may be seen as lacking sufficient blameworthiness 
to deserve the condemnation and reprobation of criminal conviction, 
1. Shift to Element Analysis 
Model Penal Code section 2.02(1) makes clear that the Code requires culpability "with 
respect to each material element of the offense,"ll In other words, it is not just that differ­
ent offenses may have different culpability requirements, With this section the Model Pe­
nal Code makes clear that different objective elements within a single offense may have 
different culpability requirements than all or some of the other objective elements of the 
offense, 
2. Culpability Levels under the Model Penal Code 
In place of the plethora of common-law terms-wantonly, heedlessly, maliciously, and so 
on-the Code defines four levels of culpability: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and neg­
ligently, Ideally, all offenses are defined by designating one of these four levels of culpabil­
ity with regard to each objective element. If the objective elements of an offense require 
that a person take the property of another, the culpability elements might require, for ex­
ample, that the person know that he or she is taking property and that he or she be at least 
reckless about it being someone else's property, An offense also may require culpability 
with regard to a circumstance or result beyond what the objective elements of the offense 
require. Thus theft may require a purpose to permanently deprive the owner of his or her 
property, although it need not be shown that the owner was permanently deprived. 
3. Purpose 
Under the Code, a person acts "purposely" with respect to a result ifhis or her conscious 
object is to cause such a result.12 This is a demanding requirement that is often difficult to 
prove. The offense ofindecent exposure, for example, requires more than showing that the 
defendant exposed himself or herself to another, knowing that it would alarm the person; 
it must be proved that the conduct was motivated by a desire to gain sexual gratification or 
arousal by the conduct. Doing it just to annoy or alarm the victim would not satisfy the 
offense's gratification purpose requirement, even if the offender did experience unplanned­
for gratificationY 
4. Purposely versus Knowingly 
A person acts "purposely" with respect to a result if it is his or her conscious object to 
cause the result. A person acts "knowingly" with respect to a result if it is not his or her 
conscious object, but he or she is practically certain that the conduct will cause that re­
sult.14 An antiwar activist who sets a bomb to destroy a draft board's offices may be practi­
cally certain that the bomb will kill the night watchman, but may wish that the watchman 
would go on a coffee break so that he would not be killed. The essence of the narrow dis­
tinction between these two culpability levels is the presence or absence of a positive desire 
to cause the result; purpose requires a culpability beyond the knowledge of a result's near 
certainty. In the broader sense this distinction divides the vague notion of "callousness" 
from the more offensive "maliciousness" or "viciousness." The latter may simply be an ag­
gressively ruthless form of the former. 
5. Knowingly versus Recklessly 
A person acts "knowingly" with respect to a result if he or she is nearly certain that his or 
her conduct will cause the result. If he or she is aware only of a substantial risk, he or she 
acts "recklessly" with respect to the result.ls The narrow distinction between knowledge 
and recklessness lies in the degree of risk-"practically certain" versus "substantial 
risk"-of which the defendant is aware. The distinction between recklessness (and lower 
levels of culpability) and the two higher levels of culpability (purposely and knowingly) is 
that we tend to scold a reckless person for being "careless," while we condemn an offender 
who falls within one of the higher culpability categories for "intentional" conduct. 
6. Purpose as Independent ofLikelihood 
While knowing and reckless culpability focus on the likelihood of causing the result­
"practically certain" versus "substantial risk" -purposeful culpability pays no regard to the 
likelihood of the result. This characteristic of the purpose requirement reflects an instinct 
that trying to cause the harm, whatever the likelihood, is more condemnable than acting 
with the belief that the harm will or might result without desiring it. The practical effect of 
this is that reckless conduct, as manifested in risk taking, can be elevated to purposeful 
conduct if the defendant hopes that the risk will come to fruition. This characteristic of 
purpose also illustrates how specially demanding it is. A requirement of a particular belief 
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is something a jury might logically deduce from other facts: the defendant "must have 
known" the certainty or the risk of harm ifhe or she knew this fact or that. A purpose re­
quirement requires the jury to determine a defendant's object or goal, a somewhat more 
complex psychological state. To find this, a jury may have to dig deeper into the defendant's 
psyche and his or her general desires and motivations to reach a conclusion. If a jury is 
conscientious in adhering to the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard constitution­
ally required for offense elements, this may be a difficult conclusion to reach. 
7. Recklessly versus Negligently 
A person acts "recklessly" with respect to a result if he or she consciously disregards a 
substantial risk that his or her conduct will cause the result; he or she acts only "negli­
gently" if he or she is unaware of the substantial risk but should have perceived it.16 The 
recklessness issue focuses not on whether he or she should have been aware of the risk, but 
instead on whether he or she was, in fact, aware (and whether it was culpable for him or 
her to disregard the risk). 
8. Recklessness as Conscious Wrongdoing 
The narrow distinction between recklessness and negligence lies in the defendant's aware­
ness of risk. The difference between negligence and the three higher levels of culpability is 
one of the most critical distinctions in U.S. criminal law. A person who acts purposely, 
knowingly, or recklessly is aware of the circumstances that make his or her conduct 
criminal or is aware that harmful consequences may result and is therefore both blame­
worthy and deterrable. A defendant who acts negligently, in contrast, is unaware of the 
circumstances or consequences and therefore, some writers argue, is neither blameworthy 
nor deterrable. Although writers disagree over whether negligence ought to be adequate 
to support criminal liability, it is agreed that negligence represents a lower level of culpabil­
ity than, and is qualitatively different from, recklessness in that the negligent person fails to 
recognize, rather than consciously disregards, the risk. For this reason, recklessness is con­
sidered the norm for criminal culpability, while negligence typically is punished in Ameri­
can jurisdictions only in exceptional situations, such as where a death is caused. 
9. Negligence as Normative Assessment 
A person who fails to appreciate the risk that his or her conduct will cause a result is "neg­
ligent" with regard to the result if the failure "involves a gross deviation from the standard 
of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation."17 Thus, unless he 
or she grossly deviates from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe, 
a person is not negligent and, at least in the eyes of the criminal law, is without cognizable 
fault. If a person is not aware of the risk of death, should he or she have been? Would a 
reasonable person in his or her situation have been aware that a risk of death existed? Was 
his or her failure to perceive the risk a gross deviation from the attentiveness to the possi­
bility of risk that the reasonable person in his or her situation would have had? These are 
the issues that a jury considers in assessing whether the person ought to be liable for negli­
gent homicide. They are not factual but rather normative issues. The jury is asked to judge 
whether the person's failure to perceive the risk was, under the circumstances, a blamewor­
thy failure. 
10. Negligently versus Faultlessly 
Liability imposed for faultless conduct is termed absolute or strict liability. The distinction 
between negligence and strict liability focuses on whether the defendant's unawareness of 
the risk constituted a failure to meet the standard of the reasonable person. The broader 
distinction between the four categories of culpability and faultlessness is the distinction 
between a blameworthy and a blameless defendant. The objections to strict liability stem 
from an understandable reluctance to punish conduct that is not unreasonable. 
11. Concurrence Requirement 
When an offense definition requires a particular level of culpability for a particular ele­
ment, it means that the required culpability for the element must exist at the time of the 
conduct constituting the offense. This concurrence requirement, as it is called, reflects 
the law's interest in judging the culpability of the act rather than the general character of 
the defendant. The required concurrence between act and culpability is implicit in the 
Model Penal Code's culpability definitions in section 2.02(2).18 It is neither necessary nor 
sufficient that the culpability exist at the later time of the result of the conduct. Changing 
one's mind after setting a bomb, for example, does not bar liability for deaths caused by 
the blast, even if the intent to kill no longer exists at the time the bomb explodes or the 
victims die. 
C. Doctrines of Imputation 
Typically a person is liable for an offense if and only if the person satisfies the elements of 
an offense definition. There are two exceptions to this rule. First, a person may be liable 
for an offense even though he or she does not satisfy all offense elements, if a rule or doc­
trine imputes the missing element. Second, a person may escape liability even though the 
person does satisfy the elements of an offense, ifhe or she satisfies the conditions of a gen­
eral defense. General defenses are discussed in section V; this section examines doctrines 
of imputation. 
1. Imputation Principles as Independent ofOffense 
A legislature conceivably could include inculpatory (and exculpatory) exceptions to the 
offense paradigm within the offense definition. For example, Tennessee defines the of­
fense of arson to include not only setting the fire but also assisting another in doing SO.19 
More typically, however, doctrines of imputation such as complicity are drafted in a form 
independent of offense definitions-a form that applies to all offenses. This approach har­
nesses the benefits of drafting efficiency, as well as encouraging conceptual clarity. Like 
general defenses-such as insanity, duress, and law-enforcement authority, which are 
separate and apart from any offense definition-the rules of imputation represent prin­
ciples ofliability independent of any single offense. An additional point of similarity with 
general defenses arises because most of the doctrines of imputation, at least theoretically, 
can impute a required element for any offense defined in the code's special part. Some 
doctrines of imputation may tend to apply most frequently to certain recurring factual 
situations. Transferred intent, for example, appears most commonly in bad-aim murder 
cases. This, however, is a factual rather than a theoretical limitation of the principle. 
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2. Doctrines Imputing Objective Elements 
American criminal law permits the imputation of both objective and culpability elements 
of an offense. The most obvious and common instances of imputing objective elements 
are found in the rules governing complicity, discussed in section III.C.3 in this chapter. 
But complicity is only one of several doctrines that impose liability even though the per­
son does not satisfy the objective elements of an offense. Where a person exercises control 
over an innocent or irresponsible person, the latter's satisfaction of the objective elements 
of an offense may be imputed to the former as an instance of "causing crime by an inno­
cent."20 Similarly, various statutory and judicial presumptions permit the imposition of 
liability even though the evidence adduced at trial would not establish the objective ele­
ments of the offense. Finally, rules imposing liability for a person's omissions, even when 
the offense charged is defined only in terms of affirmative conduct, also may be viewed as 
instances of imputed conduct. 
3. Complicity 
Complicity is not an offense in itself, as are conspiracy and solicitation (discussed in sec­
tion IILCA), for example. Rather, it is a theory of liability by which an accomplice is held 
liable for an offense committed by the perpetrator.21 An offense definition typically re­
quires that the person have performed certain conduct, but a person may be held liable for 
the offense, although the person has not performed the required conduct, if he or she is 
legally accountable for the actual perpetrator's conduct. At common law, complicity lia­
bility required that the accomplice assist the perpetrator in committing the offense. The 
assistance need not be necessary for successful commission of the offense, nor need it be 
substantial. Indeed, the accomplice need not assist in a physical sense at all; encourage­
ment is recognized as a form of assistance. On the other hand, the Model Penal Code, in 
section 2.06(3)(a)(ii), extends complicity liability to those instances in which the person 
simply "agrees or attempts to aid" the principaL Actual assistance, even in the form of 
psychological assistance through encouragement, is not required. The drafters intended 
that what constitutes an adequate "attempt to aid" will be determined by reference to the 
definition of the general inchoate offense of attempt. 
4. Doctrines Imputing Culpability Elements 
Just as a variety of rules and doctrines can impute an unsatisfied objective element of the 
offense charged, another group of doctrines can impute a required culpability element. 
The most common of these doctrines governs cases of voluntary intoxication. Even 
though a person does not have the awareness of risk required by the offense definition, for 
example, the required recklessness can be imputed to him or her by the voluntary intoxi­
cation rules. 22 Because the person voluntarily intoxicated himself or herself, the reasoning 
goes, he or she can properly be treated as if he or she had the awareness of risk that he or 
she would have had ifhe or she had not intoxicated himself or herself at all. 
Another doctrine that can impute a culpable state of mind is the doctrine of trans­
ferred intent, which imputes the required culpability to a person who intends to harm one 
person but actually harms another. Imputation also is accomplished through a device that 
may be termed substituted culpability. This doctrine uses a person's culpability for the offense 
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the person thought he or she was committing as the basis for imputing to the person the 
intention required for the offense actually committed. Thus a person who commits statu­
tory rape but who, because of his mistake about the true identity of his partner, believes 
that he is instead committing incest can nonetheless be held liable for statutory rape. His 
missing culpability with respect to his partner being underage is imputed to him on the 
grounds that he thought that he was committing another offense, namely, incest. His in­
tention to commit incest is transferred to satisfy the intent required for statutory rape. 
Another doctrine of imputation is apparent in those cases where courts permit suspen­
sion of the requirement of concurrence between act and intent: a person's earlier intention 
to commit an act that the person believes is the offense, but is not, is relied on to impute 
the required intention during the later conduct that actually constitutes the offense. Fi­
nally, as with objective elements, a variety of statutory and judicial presumptions effec­
tively impute culpability elements upon proof of a logically related fact. 
S. Corporate Criminal Liability 
Because an organization can neither act nor think except through its agents and officers, 
it cannot satisfy the elements of an offense except through imputation. Thus, if criminal 
liability for organizations is to be provided, the criminal law must specify the rules for 
imputation of conduct and culpability to an organization. Under current American law, 
two forms of liability against organizations are common and accepted. First, liability is 
permitted where the offense consists of an omission to perform a specific duty imposed on 
the organization by law.23 This requires no imputation and no application of special rules 
for liability, because liability follows directly from an organization's failure to perform the 
affirmative duty placed on it by relevant legislation. 
Most jurisdictions also permit organizational criminal liability for standard offenses 
based on an affirmative act of an agent or an omission of an agent to perform a legal duty 
not expressly imposed on the organization. Most jurisdictions permit corporate liability 
for a serious offense under certain circumstances-even for offenses carrying a significant 
penalty and requiring culpability. In State v. Christy Pontiac-GMC, Inc., for example, a sales­
man for the Christy Pontiac car dealership swindled two customers out of cash rebates 
and kept the money for the corporation. Under the rules of organizational liability used in 
Christy, the criminal acts of a corporation's agents are imputed to the corporation if they 
are (1) performed within the scope of employment, (2) in furtherance of the interests of 
the corporation, and (3) authorized, tolerated, or ratified by corporate management. 24 
Because the corporation received the swindled funds and the conduct was ratified, if not 
authorized, by the corporation's president, the corporation was held liable for the em­
ployee's criminal act. 
Some jurisdictions follow the Model Penal Code in extending liability beyond conduct 
authorized or ratified by corporate management to offense conduct "recklessly tolerated" 
by such actors. 25 This doctrine seeks to prevent management from simply turning a blind 
eye to violations because the violations further the corporate interest. Most jurisdictions 
provide a defense where upper management exercised due diligence to prevent commis­
sion of the offense.26 
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D. Inchoate Liability 
American criminal law recognizes three general inchoate offenses: attempt, conspiracy, 
and solicitation. Where a person attempts, conspires with another, or solicits another to 
commit an offense, but the offense is never committed, the person nonetheless may be li­
able for one of these inchoate offenses. 
1. Attempt 
At some point in the chain of events from thinking about committing an offense to com­
pleting it, a person's conduct becomes criminal. This point typically is described as the 
moment at which mere preparation becomes a criminal attempt. Defining this point is an 
important part of attempt liability because it demarcates both when a person becomes 
criminally liable and when authorities lawfully may intervene. Attempt is significantly 
different from other offenses under American law because even after this point is reached 
and all the elements of attempt (or other inchoate offense) are satisfied, a person typically 
may escape liability ifhe or she voluntarily and completely renounces the attempt. Absent 
such renunciation, the failure to complete an offense only prevents liability for the full of­
fense; it does not relieve the person from liability for the attempt. 
The most common American objective requirement for attempt is that the person take 
a "substantial step" toward commission of the offense.27 Rather than fOCUSing on how 
close to the end of the chain the person has come-the approach of the "proximity" test 
used at common law-this approach focuses on how far from the beginning of the chain 
the person has gone. 'The Code gives seven illustrations of what "shall not be held insuffi­
cient as a matter of law" to constitute a substantial step. 
Current American law commonly elevates the culpability required for an offense when 
it is charged in its inchoate form.28 Thus, although recklessness with respect to causing 
injury may be sufficient for aggravated assault, in many jurisdictions attempted aggra­
vated assault may require purpose or knowing with regard to causing injury. There is ! I, 

disagreement over whether this is wise policy. It may well be that attempt should require 

proof of a purpose to complete the conduct constituting the offense, but that the normal 

culpability levels for the offense elements ought not to be elevated. 

2. Conspiracy 
Conspiracy typically requires an agreement between two or more conspirators that at 
least one of them will commit a substantive offense.29 'The agreement need not be an act in 
a strict sense. Speaking, writing, or nodding can signal agreement, but one also can agree 
through silence where, under the circumstances or custom, silence is meant and under­
stood to mean positive agreement. At common law, and currently in some jurisdictions 
without modern codes, the agreement requirement is taken to require actual agreement 
on both sides-an actual "meeting ofthe minds." Thus, for the person to be liable for con­
spiracy, the other conspirator must actually be agreeing, not just pretending to agree (as 
an undercover police officer would, for example). Modern American codes have adopted a 
unilateral agreement requirement, which permits conspiracy liability as long as the per­
son agrees with another person, without regard for whether the other person is returning 
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the agreement. Perhaps because conspiracy's agreement requirement is so slim a conduct 
requirement, an overt act is typically also required of one of the conspirators in further­
ance of the agreement in order to sustain a conviction. 
3. Solicitation 
Solicitation is essentially an attempt to commit conspiracy by encouraging or requesting 
another person to do what would constitute an offense or an attempt. 30 As with conspiracy, 
the offense focuses on the person's subjective view of the world.lhe solicitation need not be 
successfully communicated; it is sufficient that the solicitor's "conduct was designed to ef­
fect such communication."3! Unlike attempt, where the person's conduct may be ambigu­
ous with respect to its criminal purpose, the solicitation offense includes no special re­
quirement that the person's conduct strongly corroborate his or her criminal purpose. 
V. GENERAL DEFENSES 
In casual language anything that prevents conviction of a person is called a defense, but 
this term includes doctrines that are very different from one another. The legal doctrines 
that we refer to as defenses typically are of five sorts: absent-element defenses, offense 
modifications, justifications, excuses, or nonexculpatory defenses. 
A. Types of Defenses 
1. Absent-Element Defenses 
Some doctrines that are called defenses are nothing more than the absence of a required 
offense element. If a person takes an umbrella, believing it to be his or her own, he or she 
may claim a mistake defense, but this defense derives not from a special defense doctrine 
about mistake as to ownership, but rather from the elements of the theft offense itself. The 
definition of theft includes a requirement that the person know that the property taken is 
owned by another. If a person mistakenly believes that the umbrella taken is his or her 
own, he or she does not satisfy the required culpability element of knowledge that it be­
longs to another.32 Such a mistake defense is called an absent-element defense (or a failure­
of-proof defense) because it derives from the inability of the state to prove a required ele­
ment. The person is claiming that the prosecution cannot prove all the elements of the 
offense. It is within accepted casual usage to call such claims defenses, but they are simply II another way of talking about the requirements of an offense definition. 
2. Offense-Modification Defenses 
Some defenses are indeed independent of the offense elements but in fact concern crimi­
, I 	 nalization issues closely related to the definition of the offense. They typically refine or 
qualify the definition of a particular offense or group of offenses. Voluntary renunciation, 
for example, can provide a defense to inchoate offenses like attempt or conspiracy.33 Con­
sent is recognized as a defense to some kinds of assault.34 Such a consent defense helps 
define what we mean by the offense of assault, just as renunciation helps refine the definitions 
of inchoate offenses (as including only unrenounced criminal plans). Indeed, assault fre­




is included as an element of the offense. As the practice illustrates, the difference between 
absent-element defenses and offense-modification defenses is one more of form than of 
substance. An offense-modification defense can as easily be drafted as a negative element 
of the offense, for each defines in part what the offense is not. 
3. Criminalization Defenses versus General Defenses 
Because both absent-element and offense-modification defenses serve to refine the offense 
definition, they tend to apply to a single offense or group of offenses. Justifications, ex­
cuses, and nonexculpatory defenses, in contrast, are unrelated to a particular offense; they 
theoretically apply to all offenses and therefore are called general defenses. Ihe recogni­
tion of each general defense rests on reasons extraneous to the criminalization goals and 
policies of the offense. A general defense is provided not because there is no criminal 
wrong, but rather despite the occurrence of a legally recognized harm or evil. Ihe of­
fense's harm or evil may have occurred, but the special conditions establishing the defense 
suggest that the violator ought not to be punished. 
4. Justifications 
Justification defenses such as lesser evils, self-defense, and law-enforcement authority ex­
culpate on the theory that the person's otherwise criminal conduct avoided a greater 
harm or eviL That is, although a person satisfies the elements of an offense, his or her of­
fense is tolerated or even encouraged because it does not cause a net societal harm. A 
person who burns a firebreak on another's land may thereby commit arson but also may 
have a justification defense (of lesser evils) because, by the burning, the person saves in­
nocent lives threatened by the fire. 'lbe commonly available doctrines of justification are 
the lesser-evils defense, the defensive-force defenses of self-defense, defense of others, 
defense of property, and defense of habitation, and the public authority defenses of law­
enforcement authority, authority to maintain order and safety, parental authority, benev­
olent custodial authority, medical authority, authority to prevent a suicide, judicial 
authority, military authority, and general public authority.35 
5. Excuses 
Excuse defenses such as insanity and duress exculpate under a different theory. The defen­
dant has admittedly acted improperly-has caused a net societal harm or evil-but the de­
fendant is excused because he or she cannot properly be held responsible for his or her of­
fense conduct Note the difference in focus between justifications and excuses: a defendant's 
conduct is justified, a defendant is excused. Excuses are of two sorts: disability excuses, 
which include insanity, involuntary intoxication, duress, and immaturity (the defense for 
involuntary conduct also serves this purpose), and mistake excuses, which include mistake 
about a justification, reliance on an official misstatement oflaw, and unreliable law.36 
6. Nonexculpatory Defenses 
A final group of general defenses does not exculpate a person but does provide an exemp­
tion from liability. Even if the person's conduct is criminal and unjustified and the person 
is fully responsible for it, such nonexculpatory defenses are made available because each 
furthers important societal interests. Thus diplomatic immunity may provide a defense, 
582 PAUL H. ROBINSON 
without regard to the guilt or innocence of the person, because by doing so a country's 
diplomats are protected from interference when abroad, and diplomatic communications 
among nations can be established and maintained. Other common nonexculpatory de­
fenses in American codes include statutes of time limitation; judicial, legislative, and ex­
ecutive immunities; and immunity after compelled testimony or pursuant to a plea agree­
mentY Further, many constitutional principles function as nonexculpatory defenses, 
such as the double-jeopardy clause and the exclusionary rule,38 as well as the legality prin­
ciple doctrines discussed earlier. 
B. Justification Defenses 
1. Lesser-Evils Defense 
The lesser-evils defense-sometimes called choice of evils or necessity, or simply the gen­
eral justification defense-is formally recognized in about half of American jurisdic­
tions.39 It illustrates the structure and operation of justification defenses generally by rely­
ing explicitly on the rationale inherent in all justifications: although the person may have 
caused the harm or evil of an offense, the justifying circumstances suggest that his or her 
conduct avoided a greater harm or evil than it caused. In the language of the Model Penal 
Code, a person's conduct is justified if it is "necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or 
to another ... provided that: the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is 
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged."40 
The triggering of a lesser-evils defense, like that of all other justifications, does not give 
a person unlimited authority. His or her response must be both necessary and proportion­
ate. The necessity requirement has two components: the conduct must be necessary in time 
and in the amount of harm caused. The lesser-evils defense, like all other justifications, 
requires proportionality between the harm or evil caused by the person's conduct and the 
harm or evil avoided. Indeed, the defense contains a more explicit statement than does any 
other justification. While most other justifications require proportionality through a gen­
eral requirement that the person's conduct be "reasonable," the lesser-evils requirement 
might be seen as being more demanding. It is not enough for the defense that the harmful­
ness of the person's conduct is generally proportionate to the harm threatened. The per­
son's conduct must be shown to have been less harmful than the harm threatened. 
2. DefenSive-Force Justification 
Defensive-force justifications are triggered when an aggressor unjustifiably threatens 
harm. The triggering conditions for defensive force are considerably more specific than 
those of the lesser-evils defense; defensive force requires an unlawful, aggressive use or 
threat of force. That the person against whom the defendant uses force is acting unlaw­
fully is not sufficient to trigger a defensive-force justification. Smoking on a bus or refus­
ing to get out of the way of an emergency vehicle may be unlawful conduct that justifies 
the use of force against the violator, but a justification defense other than defensive force 
must be relied on. For defensive force, active physical aggression is required. In order to 
trigger a defensive-force justification, the aggressor must unjustifiably threaten harm to the 
defendant. Thus, when a police officer uses justified force to effect an arrest, the arrestee 
r 
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has no right of self-defense, and others may not lawfully use defensive force on his or her 
behalf. Similarly, where a person unjustifiably attacks another and his or her victim then 
uses justified defensive force to repel the attacker, the initial aggressor has no right of self­
defense against the justified defensive response. On the other hand, where the intended 
victim uses unnecessary or disproportionate force in response, the initial aggressor gains 
a right to use defensive force. 
3. Public Authority Justifications 
Public authority justifications are available when a person has been specifically autho­
rized to engage in conduct otherwise constituting an offense that is necessary to protect 
or further a societal interest. Unlike defensive-force justifications, the person's authority is 
not limited to defensive action. He or she may act affirmatively to further a public interest, 
even one that is entirely intangible. These justification defenses most commonly are dis­
tinguished from one another according to the specific interests they foster: different de­
fenses authorize the use of force for law-enforcement purposes, medical purposes, mili­
tary purposes, judicial purposes, to maintain order and safety on public carriers or in 
other public places of assembly, or for use by parents or guardians. A catchall public au­
thority justification commonly provides a defense for performing public duties other than 
those for which a special defense is provided. 
The common structure of public authority justifications is thus that special authoriza­
tion and evoking conditions trigger a person's right to use necessary and proportional 
force. The authorization and evocation elements as triggering conditions act together to 
describe the factors and circumstances that will give rise to an authority to act. For ex­
ample, a police officer and a bus driver are both given authorizations to act, but in differ­
ent situations and with different limitations on their use of force. The necessity and pro­
portionality requirements-the response elements-describe the nature of the conduct 
that is justified once the authority to act is triggered. 
C. Excuse Defenses 

The common rationale of excuse defenses-to exculpate the blameless-gives rise to com­

mon requirements: a disability or reasonable mistake must cause an excusing condition. 

The disability and mistake excuses generate the same conclusion of blamelessness in dif­

ferent ways. In disability excuses, the disabling abnormality, such as insanity or involun­

tary intoxication, sets the person apart from the general population. The mistake excuses 

seem to do the opposite: they argue that the person should not be punished because in fact 

he or she has made a mistake that anyone else would have made in the same situation. 





1. Mistake Excuses 
Several types of mistakes are commonly allowed as grounds for a general excuse defense 
(as distinguished from mistakes that provide an absent-element defense by negating an 
element of the offense). Reliance on an official misstatement oflaw and mistake due to the 
unavailability of a law are two such general mistake excuses. A mistake about whether 
. 
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one's conduct is justified also is commonly recognized as an excuse. (A fourth commonly 
recognized mistake excuse is reliance on unlawful military orders, essentially a special 
subclass of a mistake about a justification excuse, where the justification is the public au­
thority oflawful military orders.)41 
2. Exceptions to "Ignorance ofLaw Is No Excuse" 
The common law adhered to the maxim that "ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse," 
but states following the lead of the Model Penal Code recognize two exceptions to it. A 
general defense is commonly available to a person whose ignorance or mistake of law re­
sults because the law violated was not made reasonably available or because the person 
reasonably relied on an official misstatement of the law. In a few jurisdictions the maxim 
is simply rejected, and a general excuse is given for a reasonable mistake oflaw.42 
3. Mistake with Regard to Justification 
Every jurisdiction recognizes a defense for some form of mistake with regard to a justifi­
cation. The often-unpredictable and confrontational nature of justifying circumstances 
makes such mistakes particularly understandable. This is especially true for defensive­
force justifications, where the person must make the decision to act under an impending 
threat of harm. Most jurisdictions provide the mistake defense by including the word be­
lieves or the phrase reasonably believes in the definition of the justification defense (or by 
giving a defense ifthe person acts with a proper justifying "purpose")Y This means that a 
person will get the defense ifhe or she believes that the conduct is justified, even if it is not. 
A popular alternative means of providing an excuse for mistake with regard to a 
justification-and one with some advantages-is to define justifications objectively, with­
out the "believes" language, and to provide a separate general excuse defense for mistakes 
with regard to a justification. 
4. Disability Excuses 
Similarly, disability excuses share a common internal structure: a disability causes a rec­
ognized excusing condition. The disability is an abnormal condition of the person at the 
time of the offense, such as insanity, intoxication, subnormality, or immaturity. Each is a 
real-world condition with a variety of observable manifestations apart from the conduct 
constituting the offense. It may be a long-term or even permanent condition, such as sub­
normality, or a temporary state, such as intoxication, somnambulism, automatism, or 
hypnotism. Its cause may be internal, as in insanity, or external, as in coercion from an­
other person (duress). 
Having a recognized disability does not itself qualify a person for an excuse, for it is 
not the disability that is central to the reason for exculpating the person. A person is not 
excused because he or she is intoxicated, but rather because the effect of the intoxication is 
to create a condition that renders the person blameless for the conduct constituting the 
offense. The requirement of an excusing condition, then, is not an element independent of 
the person's disability but rather is a requirement that the person's disability cause a par­
ticular result-a particular exculpating mental or emotional condition in relation to the 
conduct constituting the offense. 
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5. Mental Disease or Defect as Disability 
The disability requirement of the insanity defense is a mental disease or defect. What con­
stitutes a mental disease or defect is a question for the jury. It is a legal concept, not a 
medical one,44 but the members of the jury will no doubt be influenced by the expert wit­
nesses they hear. 
i. M'Naghten Test 
In M'Naghten's Case the House of Lords held that a person has a defense of insanity if, "at 
the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of 
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was 
doing, or, ifhe did know it, [he] did not know he was doing what was wrong."45 This test is 
in use in many American jurisdictions today.46 
ii. Irresistible-Impulse Test 
As early as 1887 the M'Naghten test was criticized as failing to reflect then-modern ad­
vances in the behavioral sciences. To permit a defense in cases where the person involved 
suffers a loss of the power to choose, a "control prong" was introduced by adding the 
irresistible-impulse test to M'Naghten. Under this modification, a person is given an insan­
ity defense ifhe or she satisfies the requirements of the M'Naghten defense or (1) if, by rea­
son of the duress of such mental disease, he or she had so far lost the power to choose be­
tween right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, that his or her free agency 
was at the time destroyed; (2) and if, at the same time, the alleged crime was so connected 
with such mental disease, in the relation of cause and effect, as to have been the product of 
it solely.47 This formulation remains popular in the United States as an addition to the 
M'Naghten test.48 
iii. American Law Institute Test 
The most modern test is that contained in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code 
§ 4.01(1): "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct 
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality [wrongfulness] ofhis conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law" (emphasis added). This formulation conceives that there are degrees of impairment 
possible and requires as a minimum that the person must "lack substantial capacity." The 
ALI test follows the structure of the M'Naghten-plus-irresistible-impulse test in specifi­
cally noting that the dysfunction may affect either cognitive or control capacities. It dif­
fers from MNaghten-plus-irresistible-impulse, however, in that those tests appear to re­
quire absolute dysfunction: the absence of knowledge of criminality or the loss of power 
to choose. The ALI test, in contrast, requires only that the person lack "substantial capac­
ity" to "appreciate" the criminality or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements 
of the law. The test has gained wide acceptance,49 rivaling or surpassing the popularity of 
the M'Naghten and M'Naghten-plus-irresistible-impulse formulations. 
iv. Federal Insanity Test 
Some jurisdictions that previously adopted the ALI test have recently cut back on it. The 
new federal insanity statute, for example, uses the "appreciates" language of the ALI, rather 
than the M'Naghten "know" language and thereby implies that there are degrees of cogni­
tive dysfunction short of complete loss that nonetheless may exculpate. On the other hand, 
the new federal statute drops the "lacks substantial capacity" language, which makes it 
closer to the apparently absolute requirement of M'Naghten. Most important, the federal 
formulation drops the control prong of the defense; it reverts to the single cognitive prong 
of M'Naghten, adopting a position that was criticized more than 100 years ago.50 
6. Involuntary Intoxication 
The involuntary intoxication excuse has a disability of intoxication and the same excusing 
conditions as the insanity defense-a cognitive or a control dysfunction. That is, a per­
son's involuntary intoxication provides an excuse if it causes the same level of dysfunction 
required by the jurisdiction's insanity defense (M'Naghten test, MNaghten-plus­
irresistible-impulse test, or ALI test, for example). Voluntary intoxication, even when se­
vere enough to cause an excusing condition, will not provide an excuse defense. 51 
7. Duress 
The duress defense typically requires that the person committed the offense while under 
coercion to do so. The defense does not require, however, that the coercion cause in the 
person a "substantial lack of capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements oflaw" 
or another similar description of the degree of control impairment that the excusing con­
ditions for insanity or involuntary intoxication require. Instead, the duress defense re­
quires that the person's disability, which is in this case the state of coercion, come from a 
particular cause: a threat of force that "a person of reasonable firmness ... would have 
been unable to resist."52 The Model Penal Code's duress formulation permits a court to 
take account of a person's individual circumstances and characteristics by allowing a par­
tial individualization of the reasonable-person standard. The seriousness of the threat is 
to be assessed against the kind of threat that would coerce "a person of reasonable firm­
ness in [the actor's] situation" (emphaSiS added). 
D. Nonexculpatory Defenses 
Nonexculpatory defenses, which give a defense even though the person's conduct may be 
wrongful and the person blameworthy, include such defenses as statutes of time limita­
tion; diplomatic immunity; judicial, legislative, and executive immunities; immunity after 
compelled testimony or pursuant to a plea agreement; and incompetency to stand trial. 
Each of these forms of immunity furthers an important societal interest. Overriding non­
exculpatory public policy interests also serve as the basis for many constitutional de­
fenses. The double-jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, for example, may foreclose 
the trial of even a blameworthy and convict able offender by barring the state from making 
repeated attempts to convict him or her. Notions of procedural fairness are said to de­
mand that the state not subject a person to the embarrassment, expense, and ordeal of 
trial more than once for the same offense, nor compel him or her to live in a continuing 
state of anxiety and insecurity. Dismissals based on the operation of the exclusionary rule 
or on prosecutorial misconduct also may be nonexculpatory in nature, especially if the 
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public policies served by nonexculpatory defenses may be as broad as protecting all mem~ 
bers of society from unlawful searches, or they may narrowly focus on assuring fairness in 
the treatment of individual defendants. 
The nonexculpatory entrapment defense furthers societal interest in deterring police mis~ 
conduct. Where a police officer or agent has had some hand in having a person commit an 
offense, the person may be entitled to an entrapment defense. 53 The United States is one of the 
few countries that recognize such a defense, and within the United States, jurisdictions dis­
agree over how the defense should be formulated. "Objective" formulations of the entrap­
ment defense focus on the impropriety of the police conduct. The defense is available, even if 
the person was predisposed to commit the offense, ifthe police conduct is such that it "creates 
a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are 
ready to commit it."54 "Subjective" formulations of the entrapment defense focus on the de­
gree to which the entrapping conduct, rather than the person's own choice, is responsible for 
commission of the offense. Under this formulation, the defense is given "because the wrong­
doing of the officer originates the idea of the crime and then induces the other person to 
[commit the offense] when the other person is not otherwise disposed to do SO."55 
The objective formulation is clearly nonexculpatory: it uses the threat of acquittal of 
the defendant as a means of deterring improper police conduct. The blameworthiness of 
the defendant is not relevant. A subjective formulation, in contrast, might appear to be an 
excuse similar to duress that exculpates the defendant because he or she is coerced to 
commit an offense. However, the subjective formulation does not require that the induce­
ment to commit the offense be one that a "person of reasonable firmness would have been 
unable to resist," as the duress excuse does. Instead, it gives the defense even if we could 
well have expected the defendant to have resisted the temptation. The subjective formula­
tion is a nonexculpatory defense like the objective formulation, but one that seeks to ex~ 
elude career criminals from the defense in order to limit the costs it accrues in trying to 
deter overreaching on the part of police. 
VI. SPECIFIC OFFENSES 
A. Overview 
Most modern American codes are typically divided into two sections common in modern 
codes around the world. The general part sets out those doctrines that are applicable to all 
specific offenses, such as the definitions of culpability level, theories of imputation, incho­
ate offenses, and general defenses, as previously discussed. The special part enumerates 
the liability requirements for each specific offense. Most American codes follow the Model 
Penal Code's approach of grouping offenses by subpart and article according to the inter~ 
est they concern: 
Offenses Involving Danger to the Person 

Article 210. Criminal Homicide 

Article 211. Assault; Reckless Endangering; Threats 

Article 212. Kidnapping and Related Offenses; Coercion 
Article 213. Sexual Offenses 
Offenses against Property 
Article 220. Arson, Criminal Mischief, and Other Property Destruction 
Article 221. Burglary and Other Criminal Intrusion 
Article 222. Robbery 
Article 223. Theft and Related Offenses 
Article 224. Forgery and Fraudulent Practices 
Offenses Against the Family 
Article 230. Offenses against the Family 
Offenses against Public Administration. 
Article 240. Bribery and Corrupt Influence 
Article 241. Perjury and Other Falsifications in Official Matters 
Article 242. Obstructing Governmental Operations; Escape 
Article 243. Abuse of Office 
Offenses against Public Order and Decency 
Article 250. Riot, Disorderly Conduct, and Related Offenses 
Article 251. Public Indecency 
The general rules for defining offenses have been discussed in sections IY.A and IY.B in 
this chapter. Details on a few of the more important offenses are given here. 
B. Homicide 
1. Murder 
With some important exceptions, an intentional killing is murder. Model Penal Code section 
210.1 (1) (a) defines murder as "criminal homicide ... committed purposely or knowingly." 
Thus either causing the death must be the person's "conscious object" or he or she must be 
"practically certain" that his or her conduct will cause the death. 56 Although all objective ele­
ments ofan offense need not have the same level ofculpability, in this instance the "purposely 
or knowingly" requirement appears to apply both to causing the result (death) and to the re­
quirement that the victim be a human being (and not just a fetus, for example). Thus it also 
must be shown that the person "believed or hoped" that the victim was a human being.57 
2. Manslaughter and Negligent Homicide 
The paradigm for murder is an intentional (knowing) killing; the paradigm for man­
slaughter is a reckless killing. The Model Penal Code provides that "criminal homicide 
constitutes manslaughter when it is committed recklessly,"58 by which the Code means a 
killing for which the person is reckless about causing death and is reckless about the vic­
tim being a human being. Where a person is not aware of a substantial risk that a death 
will result from his or her conduct, but should have been aware of such a risk, he or she is 
negligent about causing the death and is liable for negligent homicide. 
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3. Mitigation for Extreme Emotional Disturbance 
The Model Penal Code provides for a mitigation from murder to manslaughter where "mur­
der is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which 
there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse 
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circum­
stances as he believes them to be."59 The mitigation has two components. First, the killing 
must have been committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
If most people would have experienced such a disturbance under the same circumstances, 
but the person in fact did not, he or she is not eligible for the mitigation. Second, if the person 
is acting under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, there must be a 
reasonable explanation or excuse for the disturbance. No mitigation is available if the per­
son's reaction to the situation is unreasonable or peculiar to the person. 
4. Aggravation for Extreme Indifference to the Value ofHuman Life 
Although a reckless killing is normally manslaughter, homicide doctrine typically devi­
ates from the paradigm to aggravate a reckless killing to murder in circumstances judged 
to be egregious. At common law, this doctrine of aggravation was called depraved and 
malignant heart or abandoned and malignant heart murder. The Model Penal Code car­
ries forward the common law's recognition of a reckless form of murder but bases the ag­
gravation on the person's "extreme indifference to the value of human life."60 The Code 
allows a killing in the course of certain enumerated felonies to trigger a presumption of 
the recklessness and extreme indifference required for this aggravation. It offers this as a 
substitute for a felony-murder rule, which it does not otherwise recognize. 
5. Felony Murder 
Most American jurisdictions adopt a felony-murder rule, although there are many variet­
ies of the rule in operation. The traditional felony-murder rule has two components. First, 
it imposes liability for murder for any killing, even one that is entirely accidental, that oc­
curs in the course of an attempt of, commission of, or flight from a felony. Second, the 
traditional rule holds accomplices in the original felony accomplices in the murder. Nearly 
every jurisdiction limits the felony-murder rule in one or more of the following ways: the 
killing frequently must be a "probable consequence of the unlawful act"; the underlying 
felony must be a malum in se offense (an offense that is inherently wrong or evil, as op­
posed to an offense that is wrong only because it is prohibited); or the underlying offense 
must be inherently dangerous. 
C. Sex Offenses 
Rape and related sexual offenses have engendered some of the greatest controversy in the 
definition of specific offenses. This has occurred in part because of changing views of 
women and toward women, changing social mores concerning sexual relations among 
consenting adults generally, and increased awareness of the harm of unwanted intrusions 
on personal bodily autonomy. 
Traditional sexual offense statutes are concerned with intercourse induced by force or 
threat of force. Current statutes tend to go further and criminalize many lesser forms of 
conduct, often including any unconsented-to intercourse. In this area the Model Penal 
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Code's liability requirements for sexual offenses are often viewed as outdated. First, the 
Code's continuation of the common law's spousal exception is commonly dropped in 
modern American statutes. Second, in both its rape and statutory rape offenses the Model 
Penal Code follows the common-law rule of limiting liability to males who victimize fe­
males. Current statutes, in contrast, are commonly gender neutral. Statutory rape provi­
sions have also been expanded in most states. States commonly apply a two-level approach 
to this offense: sexual intercourse with a very young girl remains punishable at the level of 
rape; intercourse with a girl over a certain age but under another age (especially if the 
male is older than the female by a specified number ofyears) is a felony of a lesser degree. 
Another shift from traditional to modern sexual offense statutes is the advent of rape 
shield statutes. Defendants traditionally sought to present evidence regarding the alleged 
victim's sexual history and character. However, almost every state now denies a defendant 
the opportunity to cross-examine the alleged victim without good cause and prevents the 
introduction of evidence regarding the alleged victim's prior sexual activity. 
D. Theft Offenses 
The recent trend in modern code development has been to consolidate traditional 
common-law theft offenses, such as larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses, into a 
single theft offense. The differences between the offenses were relatively insignificant be­
cause there was no meaningful difference between the offenses in terms of the culpability 
of the defendants, their dangerousness, or the seriousness of the harm caused. The Model 
Penal Code creates a single theft offense that can be committed in a variety of ways, such 
as theft by unlawful taking or disposition, theft by deception, theft by extortion, and theft 
of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake.61 The consolidation avoids problems of 
pleading and proof by allowing the prosecutor simply to allege that the defendant stole 
and to support this at trial with evidence of any form of theft. 
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